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Abstract 
 
This article aims to examine the role of objects in the transformation 
of logics (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008) at the practice level. In 
particular, it explores how financial actors use, transform and are 
constrained by their ‘market devices’ – defined as a range of 
instruments, models and tools used by financial markets (Callon, 
Millo, & Muniesa, 2007) – when aiming to (re)design their logics and 
practices towards more sustainability. It develops a theoretical model 
based on ever expanding, institutional theory by combining it with 
practice theories. In particular, the article argues that actors transform 
their practices, logics and objects, by transforming an epistemic object 
through a collective inquiry. Empirical support is drawn from a three-
year ethnography study of a French asset management company that 
attempted to (re)design its equity investment process, following new 
demands for Socially Responsible Investment (SRI). Research 
methods combine participative observation, semi-structured 
interviews and documentary evidence. Theoretical and 
methodological contributions are outlined for both institutional and 
practice theories. 
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AUTHOR: Now that the (re)design is finished, do you think that the 
(re)organizing should have been done in a different way? 
 
PROJECT MANAGER: Of course! We should have formalized the 
organizational revival to a much greater extent. Things were done any 
old how. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Interest in institutional logics has grown rapidly over the past 15 years. At the level of industries, 
logics consist of ‘identities and valuation orders that structure the decision making and the practices of 
the players in a product market’ (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). Since they pre-condition choices for 
sense making, acting and identity (Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, forthcoming), logics play a key 
role in the unfolding and the transformation of practices.  
 
Over the past two decades, a number of scholars have stressed the need to pay more attention to the 
intra-organizational level of practices to understand how logics are transformed and new practices 
emerge in response to institutional change (Barley, 2008; Lounsbury & Crumley, 2007; Powell & 
Colyvas, 2008). In particular, whereas logics are reproduced through the everyday practices of actors, 
little research has been conducted that directly examines the transformation of logics within 
organizations. Furthermore, much of the work at the organizational level has tended to focus on heroic 
actors or successful social movements, but has seldom studied how actors behave and interpret their 
institutional context in concrete social situations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Powell & Colyvas, 2008; 
Zilber, 2002).  
 
This article is an attempt to address this shortcoming. In an effort to explore how logics are 
transformed at the practice level, it particularly aims to study the role of objects in this transformation. 
Indeed, despite the fact that the idea of including objects in organization studies is not new (Carlile, 
2002; Knorr-Cetina, 1997; Latour, 1987), we still know little about the role of objects in the process of 
organizing and transformation of logics (Kaghan & Lounsbury, 2005; Miller, 2008; Spee & 
Jarzbkowski, 2009). In particular, further research is needed about the mediating role of objects in the 
transformation of practices by actors: ‘it alerts us to the ways in which certain instruments or models 
can “mediate” between actors and arenas such as science and the economy’ (Miller & O'Leary, 2007). 
These arguments have been extended with respect to financial markets and financial knowledge. 
While it is now well recognized that financial models shape markets (MacKenzie, 2006), how and 
why these market devices frame the logics and practices of financial actors remains relatively 
unknown (Callon et al., 2007).  
 
To remedy these problems, this article follows several calls for bridging practice with institutional 
theories (Lounsbury & Crumley, 2007; Smets, Morris, & Greenwood, 2011; Thornton et al., 
forthcoming; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005). To bring these perspectives together, the article 
combines the concept of logics (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008) with the concept of technical and epistemic 
object (Knorr-Cetina, 1995, 1997; Rheinberger, 1992, 1997). An epistemic object is any object under 
research: an ‘object which embodies what one does not yet know’ (Rheinberger, 1992). When an 
epistemic object is sufficiently stable, it becomes a technical object: an object which embodies the 
knowledge available at a given moment in time.  
 
The article studies the different phases through which a working group inside an asset management 
company aimed to transform their logics and practices following new demands for Socially 
Responsible Investment (SRI). The article uses a three-year ethnography study (2006-2009) following 
a pragmatist epistemology (Dewey, 1938; Peirce, 1931), based on semi-structured interviews, 
participative observation and documentary evidence. The article analyzes how actors progressively 
transformed their logics and practices through transforming their market devices.  
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The article argues that logics, practices and objects all structure and depend on each other. In 
particular, it shows that actors transform their logics and practices through transforming their objects. 
Former technical objects become epistemic objects (i.e. generate new knowledge) and provide actors 
with a medium to transform their logics and practices. To demonstrate so, the article reports on how an 
asset management company transformed it logics and practices following new demands for SRI. It 
shows that this transformation was obtained through the market devices they used, such as the 
representation of investment processes, financial models, indicators or performance measurement 
systems.  
 
The contribution of the article is twofold: theoretical and methodological. Firstly, it expands 
institutional theories by linking institutional to practice theories. In doing so, it also enables the 
broadening of recent work on practice, which has tended to emphasize the localized meanings of 
practices over the institutional sources of meaning that participate in framing these practices 
(Jarzbkowski, 2004). Additionally, by focusing on the role of objects, the article offers new 
perspectives on how institutional logics are instantiated in and carried by actors through their 
instruments. Secondly, the article elaborates on the relevance and implications of pragmatist 
epistemology to explore institutional change in practice. 
 
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical framework. Section 3 
introduces the case study features. Section 4 explains the research methods. Section 5 presents the case 
study findings. Lastly, section 6 discusses the findings and points to further research.  
 
2. Theoretical Background 
 
2.1. Transforming Practices in Response to Institutional Change 
 
Institutions are the ‘taken-for-granted assumptions which underpin the rules and routines that shape 
day-to-day practices’ (Burns & Scapens, 2000). Institutions provide guidance on how actors should 
behave in an organizational field. An organizational field was defined by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) 
as: 
 
Those organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of 
institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory 
agencies and other organizations that produce similar services or products.  
 
In this article, the organizational field under study is the French asset management sector. Institutions 
are perceived as taken-for-granted ‘efficacious’ and ‘necessary’ requirements to ‘generate action’ 
(Tolbert & Zucker, 1996). As shared systems of meaning, institutions can be legal and/or cultural rules 
or beliefs (Scott, 2001). To perform institutions, actors rely on institutional logics (Friedland, 2009; 
Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999, 2008), which provide the schemes of meaning by 
which actors make sense of institutions in practice. Institutional logics can be defined as a ‘set of 
material practices and symbolic constructions – which constitutes its organizing principles and which 
is available to organizations and individuals to elaborate’ (Friedland & Alford, 1991).  
 
According to institutional theories, in the face of institutional change, organizations would be 
likely to decouple their formal structures from their practices in order to meet both institutional and 
technical demands (Brusson, 2002; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 2001). These institutional pressures 
would explain why organizations in an organizational field would tend to adopt the same form and 
why institutional change would have not been historically perceived as a trigger for practical change. 
However, over the past two decades, an increasing number of institutional scholars have nuanced this 
decoupling perspective. Notably, they have explored how new practices are implemented and 
internalized in response to institutional change, a process known as institutionalization (Hasselbladh & 
Kallinikos, 2000; Kostova & Roth, 2002; Sahlin & Wedlin, 2008; Zucker, 1988). Firstly, they have 
demonstrated that decoupling is not the only answer to new institutional requirements (Abernethy & 
  
Chua, 1996; Oliver, 1991). Secondly, they have argued that even if actors deliberately choose to 
decouple their symbolic displays from technical operations, the ceremonial implementation of the new 
institutions can have – intentionally or not – impacts on practices (Basu & Dirsmith, 1999; Dambrin, 
Lambert, & Sponem, 2007; Siti-Nahiba & Scapens, 2005). Notably, they have argued that the 
transformation of practices in response to institutional change is a process contingent upon actors and 
context (Hopper & Major, 2007; Lounsbury, 2008; Lounsbury & Crumley, 2007). Namely, it depends 
on how actors collectively transform their institutional logics (Bogt & Scapens, 2009; Lounsbury, 
2001). Nevertheless, still largely missing is a better understanding of the micro-dynamics of practical 
change (Powell & Colyvas, 2008; Zucker, 1991). Particularly, the juxtaposition of practice and 
institutional theories has been rare (Weick, 1995). To fill this gap, the next sections suggest a 
theoretical framework, based on practice and institutional theories, to understand how actors maintain 
or transform the institutional forces that guide daily practices. 
 
2.2. The Need for a Collective Inquiry 
 
Institutional change disrupts practices: actors are no longer able to maintain their usual activity. When 
several actors are committed to the same activity (i.e. when they depend on each other), they have to 
collectively investigate the situation to make sense in practice of the new institutions conveyed by 
institutional change. In other words, a collective inquiry begins. The concept of inquiry was first 
developed by pragmatist authors (Dewey, 1938; Peirce, 1931), who ‘considered the development of 
knowledge as an adaptive human/social response to environment conditions and an active 
restructuring of the environment’ (Lorino, Tricard, & Clot, 2010). According to Dewey (1938), an 
inquiry is: 
 
The controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one 
that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the 
elements of the original situation into a unified whole. 
 
A collective inquiry can be defined as the investigation processes – mobilized by a group of actors 
committed to the same collective activity – to make sense of an uncertain and disrupted situation. 
Collective activity refers to the processes through which actors cooperate to collectively accomplish 
the purpose of their group (Lorino, 2006). Since it depends on actors who participate in it, an inquiry 
is always physically and temporally situated; which explains why institutional, political, cognitive, 
emotional, ethical and contextual elements participate in its framing. Notably, a collective inquiry is 
characterized by the following features: 
− The inquiry is triggered by an ‘existential unease’: usual practices no longer enable actors to 
overcome the obstacles of everyday life.  
− The process of inquiry mobilizes an abductive mode of reasoning (Peirce, 1931), which 
consists of generating new hypotheses and stories that account for the situation in a plausible 
way. Abduction comprises intuition, reasoning, narrative thinking and experimentation.  
− The inquiry is both mediated and mediating (Lorino et al., 2010). To investigate, actors carry, 
use and transform mediations, which can be speech, discourses, texts or figures. The inquiry 
embodies a problem in speech and instruments and transforms the speech and instruments as it 
transforms the embodied knowledge. 
 
In particular, Dewey (1938) suggests the following pattern for the inquiry:  
1. THE ANTECEDENT CONDITIONS OF INQUIRY: for an inquiry to begin, the indeterminate 
situation must be questionable. In other words, it must be uncertain, unsettled, disturbed. 
Neither actors nor the situation considered separately are doubtful; it is the relationship 
between actors and the situation which is doubtful: actors are no longer able to make sense of 
the situation.  
2. INSTITUTION OF A PROBLEM: the initial step of an inquiry is to admit that the situation requires 
an inquiry since it is doubtful. The definition of the problem represents the partial 
transformation by the inquiry of an indeterminate situation into a determined one. Since 
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properly formulating a problem constitutes a way of finding a solution, the determination of 
the problem itself is a progressive inquiry.  
3. THE DETERMINATION OF A PROBLEM-SOLUTION: both hypothesis (ideas) and experimentation 
(verification by the facts) evolve through successive mutual iterations: a plausible story is then 
progressively built. For this purpose, several round trips between facts and ideas are 
necessary: ‘the possible solution presents itself, therefore, as an idea, just as the terms of the 
problem (which are facts) are instituted by observation’ (Dewey, 1938). 
4. REASONING: hypotheses (plausible narratives) generated by the abduction process must lead 
to propositions which can be practically experimented, through logical inferences (deduction, 
induction). 
5. THE OPERATIONAL CHARACTER OF FACTS-MEANINGS: practices cannot be (re)designed unless 
both facts and ideas are recognized as operational. For this purpose, ideas and facts must be 
experimented to be practically accepted and verified. The inquiry is successful when this goal 
is achieved. The suggested solution is twofold: new practices to overcome the practical 
difficulties of the situation which triggered the inquiry and new concepts which could be used 
in future inquiries are generated. 
 
Despite being sequential in the sense that there is a ‘trigger’ at its beginning and a conclusion at its 
end, the inquiry is a continuous process of investigation. The abductive (building of hypotheses), 
deductive (the progress of causal logical relationships) and inductive stages (experiment protocols) 
intertwine through the inquiry.  
 
2.3. The Role of Objects 
 
Two types of objects play an important role in the inquiry: epistemic and technical objects (Knorr-
Cetina, 1995, 1997; Rheinberger, 1992, 1997). An epistemic object is any object under research: an 
‘object which embodies what one does not yet know’ (Rheinberger, 1992). A technical object is a 
stable object, which embodies the knowledge available at a given moment in time. Both types of 
objects are mediating instruments. Technical objects provide actors with resources which are engaged 
to transform their practices and receive a lateral attention from them, whereas epistemic objects appear 
as the focal object of their transforming efforts: actors transform their practices through them. For 
instance, financial models are often technical objects which are used as a daily, steady and 
unproblematic resource by actors. If the financial models ‘fail’, they generate questions and become 
epistemic objects. Epistemic objects can be transformed into technical objects and vice versa. Indeed, 
instruments ‘are simultaneously things-to-be-used and things-in-a-process-of-transformation’ (Knorr-
Cetina, 1997). For instance, a management system which is used as a daily, steady and unproblematic 
resource by actors is a technical object. As soon as the management system ‘breaks down’, it generates 
questions and becomes an epistemic object. At that instant, actors are likely to investigate the situation 
to repair the management system and transform it back into a technical object. Hence, an object is 
epistemic or technical according to its status in the situation not because of its intrinsic nature. In other 
words, objects can be either technical or epistemic, depending on their role in actors’ practices. 
 
The practices associated with each type of object are not theoretically identical. A technical object 
is associated with ‘usual’ practices; which refer to what actors habitually do in their everyday life. This 
relates to how they perform their institutional logics and technical objects in their day-to-day practices. 
This comprises also what they do not do and what they would like to do: the different ‘potential 
practices’ associated with this object. When the relationship between the technical object and its 
associated practices is disrupted, it becomes an epistemic object. At this moment, the usual practices 
no longer allow actors to maintain their collective activity. Triggered by this ‘existential unease’, an 
inquiry whose purpose is to (re)build usual practices in order to transform the epistemic object back to 
a technical object begins (cf. figure 2.1). Through the inquiry, new ‘usual’ practices are generated to 
be associated with the new version of the technical object (i.e. which assumes continuity between the 
two versions of the technical object). For this purpose, actors can mobilize all the ‘potential’ practices 
associated with their technical object (i.e. those that are not usually enacted but which could be 
  
enacted). The epistemic object is said to revert back to a technical object when its associated practices 
are recognized by inquiry participants as the (new) ‘usual’ ones. Hence, the practices associated with 
the epistemic object do not relate to actors’ day-to-day practices but to the inquiry’s practices. 
However, the identification of the disrupted technical object – the epistemic object which needs to be 
transformed – is not obvious. This identification depends on the ability of inquiry participants to 
define the problem they face (cf. section 2.2).  
 
This distinction between technical and epistemic objects is very useful when exploring the 
transformation of logics in the financial sector. Indeed, the more a market devices – defined as a range 
of instruments, models and tools used by financial markets (Callon et al., 2007) – are considered as 
steady and reliable resources, the more they will be used and the less they will be questioned 
(MacKenzie & Millo, 2003). Then, market devices are likely to be used as technical objects on which 
financial actors could rely. The object and its associated logics and practices then become 
‘institutionalized’. Reciprocally, since the market devices act as mediating objects between actors and 
the financial markets, their questioning inevitably questions its associated logics and practices. Thus, 
the transformation of logics and practices could not be obtained without the transformation of the 
latter. In such a case, market devices play the role of epistemic objects.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: The Role of Objects in the Inquiry 
 
2.4. Proposal for a Theoretical Model 
 
The theoretical framework suggested in this section (cf. figure 2.2) argues that actors transform their 
practices in response to institutional change by transforming an epistemic object through a collective 
inquiry. Although this model is presented before the case study, it was designed throughout the study 
in an abductive way (Dewey, 1938; Peirce, 1931) (cf. Section 4). In particular, the model argues that 
institutional change disrupts actors’ collective activity through disturbing the relationship between a 
technical object and its associated practices. This disruption triggers an inquiry, which aims to 
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(re)build the ‘usual’ practices associated with the technical object. This occurs through the 
transformation of the technical object into an epistemic object. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: The Mechanisms of Collective Inquiry 
 
Actors use the epistemic object as a medium to transform their practices, institutional logics and 
technical objects (those which are not directly concerned by the disruption at stake in the inquiry). 
Namely, the epistemic object mediates this transformation through two roles:  
1. It is a boundary object (Star & Griesemer, 1989): a mediating instrument which enables and 
constrains the sharing of knowledge across actors. 
2. It is a research object: a mediating instrument which allows the transformation of practices, 
institutional logics and technical objects.  
Practices, institutional logics, technical objects, epistemic object are co-transformed through the 
collective inquiry and cannot be dissociated since institutional logics, technical and epistemic objects 
are all embedded in practice. Hence, how actors make sense in practice of the new institutions 
conveyed by institutional change results from the transformation of these five dimensions. Evidently, 
these four dimensions (practices, institutional logics, epistemic and technical objects) both constrain 
and enable the inquiry. For instance, while aiming to transform their practices in response to 
institutional change, actors may find the latter contradicts some of their previous institutional logics 
and find it difficult to transform their practices. The inquiry ends once the epistemic object is 
transformed into a technical object (cf. figure 2.1): the transformation of an epistemic object into a 
technical object enables actors to move from an indeterminate situation to a determinate one. 
Therefore, while institutional change is at the origin of the inquiry, the transformation of institutional 
logics is the output of the inquiry. 
 
The following sections will explore in further detail these mechanisms by analyzing how an asset 
management company facing institutional change (re)designed its collective activity through 
transforming an investment process. 
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3. Case Study Features 
 
3.1. What is SRI Mainstreaming? 
 
The institutional change under study in this article relates to SRI Mainstreaming which appeared in the 
French asset management sector a few years ago. It refers to the progressive integration of SRI criteria 
– such as environmental, social and governmental concerns – into conventional funds (i.e. traditional 
funds usually focused on financial performance). In 2009, while 90% of conventional funds in terms 
of assets integrated at least one SRI criterion, SRI funds as such represented only 2 to 3% of French 
assets under management.2 Two main elements explain the development of SRI Mainstreaming in 
France. Firstly, contrary to other countries, such as the United Kingdom and the United States, SRI has 
always followed a financial approach. Indeed, being developed over the past decade by asset managers 
and former financial analysts, SRI has conveyed the idea that better financial performance could be 
achieved in the long term by anticipating those costs linked to a below-average performance in social, 
environmental and governmental domains; a positive relationship which has not yet been borne out by 
evidence. Secondly, since 2002, the major French public pension funds – such as the FRR and the 
ERAFP – have shown great interest in SRI; an attention which has played a major role in triggering 
the development of SRI among all French asset management companies. 
 
As it develops, SRI Mainstreaming is progressively blurring the differences between SRI and the 
mainstream. Indeed, both SRI and conventional funds are now integrating SRI criteria in order to 
achieve better financial performance. Moreover, the SRI market is still unregulated: no public 
organization – such as the AMF (Autorité des Marchés Financiers)3 –controls the content of SRI 
funds. In other words, any asset management company can claim its funds are SRI. However, despite 
their similar appearance, SRI funds can be distinguished from conventional funds in two major ways. 
Firstly, while the conventional funds concerned by SRI Mainstreaming integrate one or several SRI 
criteria, SRI funds usually draw on hundreds of SRI criteria. Secondly, contrary to conventional funds, 
SRI funds are often held accountable on the SRI aspects of their investment processes. In other words, 
they must explain to what extent they differ from conventional funds, while maintaining good 
financial performance. Nevertheless, over the past few years, asset management companies have been 
increasingly required to (re)design their SRI funds. They have been forced to differentiate their SRI 
funds from conventional ones to adapt to SRI Mainstreaming and have been encouraged to offer 
innovative SRI funds in order to face the intense competition which has appeared between SRI funds. 
Given that financial criteria may contradict SRI criteria in practice, this transformation of funds has 
been all the more difficult for asset management companies.  
 
3.2. The Company under Study 
 
3.2.1. The Need for a Collective Inquiry 
 
The company under study, referred to as ‘SRI Invest’4, is a small French asset management company 
– a subsidiary of one of the largest French mutual insurance companies – managing €2 billion and 
specialized in SRI since 1997. In 2007, SRI Invest faced a predicament: its SRI funds were judged 
archaic by the consultants responsible for invitations to tender. To address this problem, the CEO of 
SRI Invest – who arrived at the end of 2006 – decided to (re)design the company’s SRI equity funds. 
For this purpose, he launched a working group, gathering seven representatives of the following 
Departments (an organizational chart is provided in figure 2.3):  
− Sales: responsible for selling funds (two project managers).  
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(Organizations for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities). Source: www.novethic.fr 
3 French Securities Regulator 
4 SRI Invest is a pseudonym.  
 
− Asset Management: responsible for the financial aspects of funds (one asset manager and his 
assistant).  
− SRI: responsible for the SRI aspects of funds (three SRI analysts).  
 
 
CEO
Director of 
Marketing 
and SRI
SRI 
Department
Marketing 
Department
Asset
Management 
Department
Equity Fixed-Income Multi-funds
Director of 
Support 
Functions
Support 
Functions
 
Figure 2.3: SRI Invest’s Organizational Chart 
 
The purpose of the working group was clear: to (re)design the SRI equity funds in order to meet both 
SRI demands and financial performance. Given that the three Departments depended on each other, 
the (re)design of funds had to be collective.  
 
3.3. The (re)Design of Collective Activity  
 
An SRI equity fund is an entity which collects money from different investors in order to invest it in 
shares. To achieve financial performance, an equity asset manager aims to select the companies whose 
share value is most likely to increase. A portfolio refers to the composition of the fund in terms of 
companies. A portfolio usually comprises between 40 to 50 companies, often the three to five best 
companies – financially and SRI speaking – in each sector. When investing, a client assesses a fund on 
four main aspects: 
− Assets under management: they must be at least ten times bigger than the assets in which the 
client wants to invest.  
− Financial performance: the fund must ‘beat the market’, which means that its financial 
performance must exceed the reference index and competitor fund performances.  
− Administrative costs: the asset management company’s fees must be the least expensive.  
− Investment process: this describes the various stages through which companies are selected for 
the portfolio. The investment process must convince clients of the asset management 
company’s ability to achieve better financial performance (i.e. its capacity to invest in 
companies whose share value is likely to increase). An investment process combines 1) actors’ 
usual practices and 2) the physical representation of these practices, which can take the form 
of diagram, texts, and so on (cf. figures 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 for examples). 
 
When (re)designing a fund, an asset management company needs to (re)design the investment process 
of the fund. The investment process of an SRI fund usually follows a three-stage approach: 1) 
financial and SRI analysis; 2) the definition of an ‘investment universe’ which comprises all 
companies in which asset managers can invest and 3) decision criteria followed by asset managers to 
select companies in this investment universe. In other words, an investment process must explain the 
collective activity of the asset management company. The remainder of this article argues that actors 
use the representation of their investment process as an epistemic object to transform their collective 
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activity – and thereby their technical objects, institutional logics and practices – in response to SRI 
Mainstreaming. 
 
To gain a better understanding of the collective activity of SRI Invest, table 2.1 summarizes the 
main characteristics of the three types of actors who participated in the (re)design. In this particular 
case study, the institutional logics are identified to the professional logics of the three Departments 
(i.e. Asset Management, Sales and SRI). 
 
 Asset Managers Project Managers SRI Analysts 
    
Aim Maintaining good financial 
performance. 
Selling funds, which 
means receiving new 
assets from investors. 
 
Favoring the most 
socially responsible 
companies. 
    
Performance 
Criteria 
−  Financial performance of 
funds, compared to their 
peers and reference index 
(assessed on a weekly 
basis, except for bonuses 
which are based on annual 
performance).  
Number of assets obtained 
from new investors during 
the year. 
−  Number of 
companies analyzed 
each year.  
−  Commitment to 
business 
development during 
the year.   
    
Main 
Technical 
Objects In-
Use 
−  Financial models which 
provide the best theoretical 
composition of portfolios.   
−  Financial analyses 
provided by brokers.  
−  PowerPoint 
presentations which 
represent investment 
processes. 
−  Track-record of the 
company regarding 
previous invitations to 
tender.  
Social ratings 
obtained from social 
rating agencies. 
    
Institutional 
Logics 
−  Financial background. 
−  They rely as much on 
technical objects as on their 
knowledge, experience and 
intuition to select the 
companies likely to be the 
most profitable in the long 
term.  
−  To achieve good financial 
performance, they aim to 
lower as much as possible 
their constraints (including 
SRI constraints).  
−  Commercial 
background.  
−  They need to understand 
the job of asset managers 
and SRI analysts to be 
able to explain 
investment processes to 
clients in a simple and 
‘attractive’ way.  
−  They always look for 
new ideas, new ‘stories 
to tell clients’, which 
may help them to 
differentiate funds from 
competitors’. 
−  Ethical background 
(CSR Departments, 
social rating 
agencies, trade 
unions, NGOs, et 
cetera.).  
−  They want to 
change companies’ 
behavior through 
asset management.  
−  They aim to be 
informed on a daily 
basis about the 
companies they 
analyze and to 
constantly 
strengthen the 
importance of SRI 
criteria in 
investment 
processes. 
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 Asset Managers Project Managers SRI Analysts 
Power −  They benefit from 
significant power and 
legitimacy. 
−  They are considered to 
embody the ‘value’ of the 
asset management 
company.  
−  SRI analysts and support 
functions work for them. 
−  They are perceived as 
key actors for obtaining 
new assets.  
−  Since they are 
responsible for the 
invitations to tender, 
asset managers and SRI 
analysts must meet their 
demands. 
−  However, asset 
managers and SRI 
analysts often doubt 
their technical 
competences and 
complain about their 
power regarding their 
lack of technical 
legitimacy.  
−  They lack power 
and legitimacy.  
−  They are paid less 
and are often 
perceived as 
militants with little 
awareness of 
financial problems. 
−  Nevertheless, they 
are also perceived 
as key people to 
maintain the 
competitiveness of 
SRI funds and 
participate in 
almost all company 
projects. 
 
Table 2.1: Actors Characteristics 
 
The interactions between actors are explored in further detail when analyzing the process of (re)design 
in section 5. The following section explains the research methods used to conduct the case study. 
 
4. Research Methods 
 
4.1. Research Epistemology 
 
Accessing practices is a difficult task when conducting research. It requires a high level of integration 
of the researcher in the organization and a finely-shaded understanding of situations. Few 
methodologies enable this. In particular, methodologies following representational epistemologies – 
which assume a correspondence between theory and reality – often mistake ‘traces’ of practices for 
practices (Lorino et al., 2010). On the one hand, they usually use mediating statements – such as 
documents or interviews – to access practices. On the other hand, they tend to describe reality as if it 
was an ‘objective’ thing; which leads researchers to miss the dialogical and dynamic relationships of 
practical actions. Consequently, the ‘reflexive practices’ by which actors make familiar commonplace 
activities of everyday life – their ‘accounting practices’ (Garfinkel, 1967) – are often disregarded. As 
Fox (2006) suggests: 
 
Settings do not stand there ready-made and pre-defined but are made-up in situ5 by 
the same practices which make them accountable to the members. 
 
Since the ‘accounting practices’ (Garfinkel, 1967) of actors can be ‘known only in the doing’ (Coulter, 
1976), a researcher who aims to access practices needs to study the situations ‘from the inside’ and not 
‘from the outside’ (Schotter, 2006). Unlike ‘aboutness-thinking’, this ‘withness-thinking’ (Schotter, 
2006) implies sharing the ‘accounting practices’ of the social group under research. The researcher no 
longer observes practices but investigates them. 
 
For this purpose, the researcher can conduct a pragmatist inquiry (Dewey, 1938; Peirce, 1931). 
According to pragmatism (cf. section 2.2), the objective of research is to offer an understanding for a 
purposeful action (Peirce, 1931). An inquiry is triggered by an ‘existential unease’ and differs from an 
                                                 
5 Emphasized in the original text.  
  
automatic adaptation of practices based on conditioned reflex. It is verbalized, socialized and implies a 
distance between the inquiry participants and the object of the inquiry (i.e. its purpose). To investigate, 
the researcher mobilizes an abductive mode of reasoning, which interlaces narrative thinking, intuition 
and action (Peirce, 1931). Throughout, inquiry participants carry, use and transform mediations; which 
explains why the inquiry is both mediated and mediating (Lorino et al., 2010). The inquiry is a 
collective process made up of permanent dialogue between actors, whose differences nurture the 
investigation. Inquiry participants share and negotiate their understandings of situations along time 
(Schotter, 2006). The inquiry generates both new concepts and new practices (Lorino et al., 2010). The 
theoretical accounts of findings are deemed relevant once they are practically experimented. However, 
both practices and theories are temporary and fallible; they are always partial and can always be 
changed according to experience. 
 
Following pragmatist epistemology, the article uses a cooperative inquiry method (Heron, 1996; 
Heron & Reason, 1995), based on the concept of inquiry (Dewey, 1938; Peirce, 1931). A cooperative 
inquiry method ‘involves two or more people researching a topic through their own experience of it, 
using a series of cycles in which they move between this experience and reflecting together on it’ 
(Heron, 1996). The research process is described below. 
 
 
4.2. Research Process 
 
The case study is based on a three-year doctoral research project (2006-2009), conducted by the 
author. During these three years, I was involved in SRI Invest both as a researcher and as an SRI 
analyst. In particular, during the year of (re)design, I was at SRI Invest every day. Thanks to a CIFRE 
(Convention Industrielle de Formation par la Recherche en Entreprise)6 agreement – conducted 
between my laboratory, SRI Invest and myself, under the control of the French Ministry of Research – 
I was permitted to use the data I collected through my position as an SRI analyst for academic 
purposes. According to the typology of membership roles of Adler and Adler (1987), I adopted the 
position of a complete member, which meant that I was ‘fully immersed in the research setting’. This 
long and in-depth participative observation enabled me to understand the beliefs, values and goals of 
SRI Invest members. This position was both ‘convert’ and ‘opportunistic’ (Adler & Adler, 1987). It 
was a ‘convert’ membership since I first decided to study SRI Invest, a company for which I was not 
previously working. However, it was also an ‘opportunistic’ membership in the sense that I did not 
expect this (re)design. Indeed, the new CEO of SRI Invest arrived six months after the beginning of 
my contract. Moreover, I discovered that SRI Invest was facing problems with its funds once I began 
to work as an SRI analyst. 
 
During the year of (re)design (August 2007-July 2008), I supported my participative observation 
with day-to-day field notes.7 I described the main events of each day I spent at SRI Invest: meetings, 
e-mail, informal discussions, participation in invitations to tender and so on. Throughout, I discussed 
the process of (re)design with my SRI Invest colleagues and supervisors. At the beginning of 2008, I 
realized that SRI Invest was facing institutional change. I began to write narratives which described 
how actors (re)designed their practices and compared them to what was described in the literature. 
Rapidly, I identified the mechanisms of a pragmatist inquiry (Dewey, 1938; Peirce, 1931). After the 
(re)design, I left SRI Invest for six months to commit myself to research. During this period, I worked 
on the narratives and documentary evidence, such as minutes of the meetings, process presentations to 
clients (both working and final versions), responses to invitations to tender, and e-mails. On my return, 
I submitted a working version of this article to SRI Invest members and my supervisors in order to 
obtain their critical feedback for us to collectively agree on the findings. Regarding the enthusiasm of 
the company for the research project, I decided to interview all the members who participated in the 
(re)design. In February and March 2009, I conducted seven semi-structured interviews (six with the 
13 
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working group members and one with the CEO), lasting between one and two hours. All interviews 
were tape-recorded and transcribed verbatim. For each stage of the (re)design, I asked each actor to 
explain to me in a retrospective way 1) their feelings, 2) what they understood of the situation, 3) how 
the (re)design concretely occurred, 4) why they acted in a certain way, 5) how they interpreted the 
reactions of other members, 6) if they thought it was a good choice. At the end of the interview, I 
asked them if they thought that the (re)design was successful and why, and which key events they 
remembered. In June 2009, I left SRI Invest to commit myself to research. 
 
From April 2009 to April 2010, I wrote several versions of the paper – which I successively 
submitted to SRI Invest members and other researchers. I considered that my theoretical account of 
findings was relevant when both SRI Invest members and my supervisors agreed with the analysis. 
These research findings are presented in the next section. 
 
5. Case Study Findings 
 
This section describes and comments on the different stages of the (re)design using the pattern of 
inquiry developed by Dewey (1938) (cf. section 2.2.). Given that an inquiry is a continuous process 
and for clarification purposes, the first and the second stages of the pattern, on the one hand, and the 
third and the fourth stages, on the other, have been merged. 
 
5.1. Stages 1&2: Indeterminate Situation and Institution of a Problem (August-September 
2007) 
 
5.1.1. Investment Process before the Inquiry 
 
In August 2007, SRI equity funds of SRI Invest were invested among the Dow Jones Eurostoxx 300, 
an index which represented 300 large, mid and small capitalization companies of 12 Euro zone 
countries. A quarterly SRI ranking of the companies in each activity sector was provided by SRI 
analysts to asset managers. This SRI ranking had not evolved since 1998 and was very simple: SRI 
grades provided by one social rating agency were summarized and balanced to provide an average SRI 
grade between 0 and 100 for each company. Asset managers followed the so-called best-in-class 
approach: in each sector, they favored companies with the best SRI grade, compared to their peers. To 
maintain good financial performance, the distribution of assets between sectors followed financial 
criteria, such as risk and diversification ratios. A monthly SRI grade was given to each portfolio – this 
consisted of assessing the average SRI grades of companies present in the portfolio. The SRI grade of 
each portfolio had to be over 50/100. If it was not the case, the asset manager was forced to change the 
content of his/her portfolio for the following month, although this never happened. 
 
5.1.2. A Doubtful Situation 
 
For an inquiry to begin, actors must face an uncertain and disturbing situation, as was the case for SRI 
Invest at this time. Due to the development of SRI Mainstreaming, an ‘existential unease’ had 
appeared inside the company: SRI funds were no longer competitive. Indeed, the reactions of clients 
and prospects when project managers – who arrived a few months before – submitted the investment 
process were clear: 
1. The integration of SRI criteria in the company selection process was too superficial: more 
companies had to be excluded for SRI reasons only, a criterion known as ‘SRI selectivity’.  
2. The form of the SRI constraint (i.e. being above 50/100) was not sufficiently reliable. Indeed, 
this grade could be obtained by combining very good and very bad companies in the 
portfolio. 
3. SRI criteria lacked innovation, compared to competitors.  
 
At first, project managers thought that it was merely a problem of communication, although they had 
since changed their opinion. In September 2007, they believed that the investment process itself was 
  
problematic: SRI funds had to be transformed to meet new client and consultant demands. For this 
purpose and to restore a determinate situation, the CEO launched a collective inquiry, which took the 
form of a working group gathering representatives of the Sales, Asset Management and SRI 
Departments. The working group planned to meet on a weekly basis: an ‘SRI committee’ would be 
organized every Tuesday morning. The CEO explained:  
 
Post-mortem assessments were no longer useful. […] We had to think up new 
attractive products, which meant performance and originality in the presentation. 
The working group was launched for two reasons: we’re cleverer when we work as 
a group and employees needed to appropriate the process. […] It had to be a 
communal project. That’s how it works best.  
CEO, 2009 
 
From then on, actors were encouraged to innovate by proposing new ideas. The working group would 
provide them with time and space for discussing their practices.  
 
5.2. Stages 3&4: Determination of a Problem-Solution & Reasoning (September 2007-
January 2008) 
 
5.2.1. Finding the Good Epistemic Object 
 
The first meeting took place in September 2007. Actors were somewhat ‘lost’ since they had never 
transformed a fund and did not know what to do. Asset managers and SRI analysts thought that project 
managers did not understand their job and vice versa. Actors aimed first at meeting their own demands 
and project managers took the lead of the group. Rapidly, the Sales Department realized that they 
needed something which could enable everybody to understand each other and mediate the inquiry; in 
other words, an epistemic object. They decided to work on ‘company factsheets’, which would 
summarize the SRI and financial profile of each company. Indeed, despite what they had previously 
said, project managers maintained the belief that SRI Invest needed only to prove its expertise and 
meetings were heated during the first few weeks. Rapidly, the company factsheets revealed themselves 
to be a bad epistemic object. After one and half months, the working group reached a deadlock: SRI 
analysts and asset managers did not succeed in designing the factsheets. According to them, factsheets 
could not be designed without (re)thinking the investment process itself: 
 
The company factsheets were merely for commercial purpose. […] We completely 
disagreed. Sales managers really needed them as a commercial tool. Whereas, for 
us [asset managers and SRI analysts], it was rather the opposite. It wasn’t a tool, it 
was pure reporting. And, I must say, reporting with very little added-value. […] It 
was completely of secondary importance.  
Asset Manager, 2009 
 
It was the worst thing we could have done! It was putting the cart before the horse. 
It was not triggered by the (re)design of the process but by the external motivation 
to demonstrate that we had a process which did not exist! 
SRI Analyst, 2009 
 
These two quotations demonstrate that the company factsheets were relevant neither for SRI analysts 
nor for asset managers. Being chosen by the Sales Department – according only to its own institutional 
logics – they did not enable the sharing of knowledge between actors. In other words, the company 
factsheets did not play an essential role for an epistemic object: being a ‘boundary object’ (Star & 
Griesemer, 1989). According to the Director of Marketing & SRI himself, this first choice was not a 
good one:  
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Even today, working on the company factsheets is not easy. Frankly, these 
company factsheets have been a failure.  
Director of Marketing &SRI, 2009 
 
This error illustrates that the identification of the technical object to be transformed into an epistemic 
object is not obvious. Finding the good epistemic object is part of the problem-solution stage, which is 
– according to Dewey (Dewey, 1938) – of major importance for the inquiry and a matter of delicacy.   
 
In October 2007, the working group realized its mistake. They could not transform the funds 
without transforming their investment process. They decided to work on another epistemic object: the 
representation of the investment process (i.e. the PowerPoint presentations). For the first time, they 
represented their collective activity (cf. figure 2.4): 
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Figure 2.4: Investment Process (October 2007)8  
(a) (c) (b)
 
They identified three steps: a) the SRI analysis provided the investment universe; b) the portfolio was 
constructed according to the risk and diversification ratios chosen by clients; c) the asset manager 
selected companies so as to respect the SRI grade constraint and financial ratios; this included 
arbitrage which is the practice of taking advantage of a price difference between two or more markets. 
At the same time, they compared this investment process to competitors’ processes and clients and 
consultants demands. They identified two problems they wanted to remedy: the asset manager lacked 
freedom when investing and insufficient companies were excluded for SRI reasons (i.e. which meant 
low SRI selectivity). 
 
5.2.2. Overcoming Contradictory Logics 
 
Now that they had agreed on a common problem, the main challenge for the working group was to 
overcome contradictory institutional logics at stake in the inquiry: the logics of the Asset 
Management, Sales and SRI Departments, respectively. The situation was all the more difficult since 
actors were looking for a synthesis of these three logics. Yet, SRI criteria and financial performance 
often contradicted each other and asset managers and SRI analysts did not always understand business 
demands. The priorities of each Department being different, actors faced major problems in achieving 
a collective agreement. As the following e-mail from an SRI analyst illustrates, the inquiry required 
efforts: 
  
 
8 Source : SRI Invest 
  
From: SRI Analyst 19 
Date: Friday 26/10/2007 19:28 
To: Project Manager; SRI Analyst 2; Equity Asset Manager; Fixed-Income Asset 
Manager 
Cc: Director of SRI & Marketing 
Object: RE: Committee 23/10/2007 
Hi, 
 
For the next committee, I think that it would be useful to come back to the 
definition of our priorities and working methods. To date, we have agreed on some 
priorities: 1) company factsheets, 2) sector analyses, 3) investment process. 
However, there are also other priorities we could consider: 4) annual meetings, 5) 
shareholder activism and 6) suppliers’ analysis.  
Too many priorities: no more priority. Today, everybody does what he/she 
wants or chooses what he/she considers to be the major priority, evidently at the 
expense of others. Choices are not always the same. Since everybody behaves the 
same way, we come up with scattered outputs which are very difficult to 
consolidate and to account for in a coherent way. Moreover, I am sometimes 
surprised that what is required for display concerns (let’s say for marketing 
purposes) quickly becomes the content of our solution which contradicts what is 
required.  
To celebrate the festive season with the impression of having gone one step 
further in our project, I think that it would be useful to report on the project’s 
progress at the next committee meeting, scheduled for the 6/11. Based on my 
personal experience, this is necessary to avoid personal (often barely perceptible) 
and collective problems we could risk facing.  
 
Best wishes,  
 
SRI Analyst 1 
 
This synthesis required time, mutual understanding and a capacity to transform practices, institutional 
logics and technical objects according to institutional change and to the priorities of each Department. 
In particular, the project manager tried to take advantage of his cross-border position to facilitate the 
achievement of a compromise between the logics of the three Departments: 
 
I tried to reconcile each party’s interests, which were evidently different: SRI 
purists; asset managers without regret and the Director of Marketing & SRI who 
really wanted to show that the process was, in fact, simple, robust and immutable. 
Project Manager, 2009 
 
5.2.3. Transforming Collective Activity through the Epistemic Object  
 
To reach a compromise, inquiry participants took the diagram of the investment process (cf. figure 
2.4) as an epistemic object and set up a white board for each actor to physically transform the 
investment process. Over the course of a few weeks, the working group attempted to (re)design the 
three stages (a, b and c) of the investment process. Arrows were added, new stages appeared, others 
disappeared, names changed and so on. Each actor reacted to the proposed changes from his/her 
perspective. In November 2007, they had come up with a new schema (cf. figure 2.5). 
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Figure 2.5: Investment Process (November 2007)10 
 
However, this new investment process did not remedy the problems. Indeed, the first three steps had 
hardly changed. The main change was the addition of a fourth step concerning shareholder activism, 
which related to the use of equity stakes in a corporation to put public pressure on its management 
(referred to in the step 4 of the figure 2.5 as preferential voting). Further work was required and the 
working group decided to keep transforming its epistemic object. As the schema evolved, project 
managers submitted it to prospects to obtain their feedback. Throughout, constant round trips were 
made between reasoning and experimentation: 
 
The problem was that we needed to sell the funds as we created them. This led to 
many tensions in the working group, notably in terms of timing. We submitted the 
presentation to a prospect one day, and the following day, we had to (re)design the 
process. […] Each time I came back with new questions we needed to answer.  
Project Manager, 2009 
 
Gradually, actors transformed their institutional logics, technical objects and practices. The 
transformation of the investment process raised new questions: ‘Which criteria must be selected?’, 
‘What is the purpose of SRI?’, ‘What do we do if financial and SRI criteria contradict one other?’ 
Each Department worked on its part of the process: asset managers worked on financial criteria, SRI 
analysts on SRI criteria and project managers on the PowerPoint presentations. Many informal 
discussions occurred, but every week, each actor had to submit to the others his/her proposals during 
the SRI committee meeting. Discussions continued to take place about each actor’s hypothesis. 
Notably, these weekly meetings enabled all members to acquire the same level of information and to 
set deadlines. They organized the inquiry by giving each actor his/her chance to speak: 
 
The more we developed the process, the more we rationalized the debates inside 
the committee: we stopped talking about everything and became much more 
organized. Once this process had been launched, everybody could go back to 
his/her job: asset managers to asset management and SRI analysts to SRI.  
Asset Manager, 2009 
 
As the research process unfolded, the institutional logics of actors converged to SRI Mainstreaming: 
SRI criteria were selected according to their impact on business while the working group agreed to 
exclude companies for SRI reasons. The adoption of this logic was a way for each Department to meet 
its requirements: SRI selectivity, financial performance and innovative processes. Indeed, companies 
assessed negatively on SRI aspects were also expected to rate negatively on financial aspects. 
However, this choice also resulted from personal convictions, since the asset manager defined himself 
as an SRI asset manager, SRI analysts became increasingly attuned to financial logics and the project 
18 
 
                                                 
10 Source : SRI Invest 
  
managers believed that SRI funds were good ‘stories to tell clients’. These changes were also driven 
by the solidarity which existed in the working group: actors wanted to succeed. It was also a strategic 
choice, which followed institutional change itself. As the working group submitted its investment 
process to prospects and consultants, it realized that SRI Mainstreaming was expanding into asset 
management. 
 
The working group progressively made sense of SRI Mainstreaming: SRI criteria had to be of 
assistance in selecting the most socially responsible companies. Consequently, asset managers and SRI 
analysts needed to find SRI criteria which impacted business. To do so, they had to transform the 
technical objects they used: a new SRI data-base was created and econometric tests were carried out. 
Through transforming their epistemic object, actors generated new technical objects: 
 
We decided to create an SRI data-base because we were all aware that with the new 
process, we needed to build new tools; I would call them decision-making tools. 
They needed to be somewhat industrialized and automatic.  
Asset Manager, 2009 
 
However, financial performance was not sufficient. The working group also had to differentiate their 
SRI funds from conventional ones and thought that this could be achieved through high SRI selectivity 
– which related to the number of companies excluded only for SRI reasons – and which was widely 
used by consultants to assess funds. 
 
In January 2008, practices were transformed according to SRI Mainstreaming: SRI criteria were 
deemed as important as financial criteria in generating financial performance. The working group had 
a new investment process (cf. figure 2.6) based on a decision matrix (cf. figure 2.7) as well as new 
company assessment factsheets (cf. appendix 1). 
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Figure 2.6: Investment Process (January 2008)11  
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Figure 2.7: Decision Matrix (January 2008)12  
 Company overrepresented in the portfolio compared 
to its proportion in the reference index. 
  
 Company equally represented in the portfolio 
compared to its proportion in the reference index. 
  
 Company under represented in the portfolio 
compared to its proportion in the reference index. 
  
 Company excluded from the portfolio. 
 
 
SRI analysis was much more complex and stemmed from the grades of three social rating agencies 
and SRI analysts’ analyses. Companies were ranked through a decision matrix according to their SRI 
and financial ranking. Companies with the best SRI and financial profile would be overrepresented in 
the portfolio. Companies with an excellent SRI profile but a very bad financial profile, and vice versa, 
would be excluded (cf. figure 2.7). Other companies would be selected according to their SRI and 
financial profile. SRI selectivity (i.e. the category ‘SRI laggards’) was expected to represent 50% of 
the investment universe. 
 
5.3. Stage 5: The Operational Character of Facts-Meanings (January-July 2008) 
 
In January 2008, the investment process had been re-designed ‘on paper’, but was not yet 
implemented. Indeed, the inquiry could not end until both facts and ideas were recognized as 
                                                 
11 Source : SRI Invest 
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operational. Consequently, the working group first decided to conduct ‘back-testing’ (i.e. testing the 
new investment processes on fictitious portfolios) under the supervision of asset managers. As this 
was a first time experience, they faced a number of unexpected problems including the choice of 
software, the selection of technical constraints and so on. As a result, the back-testing took more time 
than originally planned. However, during the entire period, actors met on a weekly basis to discuss the 
problems faced by asset managers. Moreover, whereas existing funds did not follow the new 
investment processes, actors behaved as if the new process were already implemented. Thus, project 
managers sold the new process and asset managers and SRI analysts discussed company ratings using 
their new criteria. Practices, institutional logics and technical objects of the working group were 
already transformed in response to institutional change. Throughout, actors continued to change the 
investment processes. As an SRI analyst explained: 
 
When designing a process, we implement it and we wait for the feedback from 
asset managers. If we realize that the asset manager is too limited when investing, 
we change SRI selectivity. 
SRI Analyst, 2009  
 
Once it was transformed according to these insufficiencies, the epistemic object suggested new 
insufficiencies which, in turn, guided the research process. The SRI analyst continued: 
 
When you provide an asset manager with a ranking, he/she tells you that there is a 
problem. So it makes you study the ranking. In doing so, you identify other 
problems in the analysis, thought it was not your first purpose. You shouldn’t have 
found this mistake. But, by solving one problem, you created another one.  
SRI Analyst, 2009  
 
The new investment process was finally implemented in May 2008. However, two weeks later, the 
50% SRI selectivity raised major problems: too many companies still had a contradictory SRI and 
financial profile. A 50% SRI selectivity threatened financial performance. Hence, the epistemic object 
kept suggesting where to investigate through the insufficiencies it displayed. Facing these problems, 
inquiry participants decided to continue to transform the investment process. However, this decision 
was not easy to make for the group: several actors were afraid of lacking the courage to continue the 
investigation. The inquiry kept demanding efforts: 
 
There comes a moment when I’m afraid because I can sense lassitude; this 
happened at the end of the first term of 2008. I saw that guys were dragging their 
feet, that some of them no longer attended meetings. We no longer knew what to 
do: one day, we did one thing, the next day, another. […] To my mind, we were 
steering off course, although we did finally get back on track.  
Director of Marketing & SRI, 2009 
 
This inquiry continued back and forth between reasoning and experimentation. Throughout this long 
and unpredictable process, the investment process matured. In June 2008, the working group decided 
to lower SRI selectivity to 40%, then 25%. In July 2008, the working group officially finished the task 
and the new investment process seemed to work in practice. The inquiry was interrupted when the 
working group – and more particularly the CEO – judged that the epistemic object was sufficiently 
transformed; at least enough to become convincing and commercially effective. The CEO comments: 
 
There comes a moment when you have to stop looking for something else, since 
it’s no longer useful – you don’t find anything further… It’s a bit like doing 
research. But I don’t have to tell you that, do I? There comes a moment when you 
have something that you shouldn’t try to improve. You must go with it and then… 
carry on. 
CEO, 2009 
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Nevertheless, certain actors complained about the superficial aspect of the (re)design. They felt that 
they did not have enough time to (re)design the process. This was highlighted by the following remark 
made by an asset manager: 
  
Sales wanted to implement something quickly because they had time constraints. 
Regarding SRI and financial aspects, we didn’t have the same time-scale since it 
was obvious that we couldn’t fail. We couldn’t launch a new process without 
having previously tested it. […]  Finally, the time constraint won out. It conveyed a 
pragmatic and industrial approach, at least on the quantitative aspects. 
Asset Manager, 2009  
 
In other words, time constraints forced the working group to finish the (re)design though the resulting 
technical object was not judged fully relevant by all actors. Despite this, the new investment process 
was accepted from then on; it became a technical object whose associated practices were considered as 
the (new) usual ones. 
 
5.4. Epilogue (January 2010) 
 
The fact that an epistemic object has been transformed into a technical object does not mean that the 
inquiry is perceived as successful by inquiry participants. In fact, success differed according to actors’ 
view points. In January 2010, one and half years after the (re)design, all working group members 
agreed on at least one success of the inquiry: they transformed their collective activity in response to 
SRI Mainstreaming. A discussion with the asset manager illustrated this point: 
  
AUTHOR: Would you say that it [the process of (re)design] has been a success? 
ASSET MANAGER: It’s a bit early to say so, but if we consider how inexperienced 
the team was and the challenge involved, which I find, was no mean feat, and if I 
take the short track-record we have today, then yes, we’ve succeeded. […] We 
worked very hard on this process. We really did our best. 
 
In particular, members were very proud of having overcome contradictory logics. Indeed, project 
managers, SRI analysts and asset managers were now working together through the new investment 
process. They were all convinced that SRI criteria would generate financial performance in the long 
term although they still lacked the time to prove it. 
 
Regarding business success, the outcomes were contradictory. On the one hand, the investment 
process was recognized as being one of the most inventive processes of the sector. Indeed, in 
September 2009, SRI Invest was among the 97 funds (among the 250 funds listed) to obtain the ‘SRI 
label’ of Novethic, whose goal is to boost the development of SRI in France. Furthermore, SRI Invest 
was one of four funds (among the 87 which obtained the SRI label) to receive the ‘SRI criteria’ label, 
which rewards those funds considered to be the most innovative in terms of SRI. On the other hand, 
the new investment process was not a major success among clients. Notably, the lack of innovation of 
the investment process perceived by clients participated in this commercial failure. Regarding 
competitors, the investment process was not deemed to be sufficiently innovative to compensate for 
the lack of assets and experience. Other factors also contributed to this: the limited number of assets 
under management, the lack of experimentation of the new investment process and the financial crisis 
which favored fixed-income over equity funds. Consequently, the future of SRI Invest was from then 
on compromised. A few months before, a takeover threat appeared and SRI Invest members were 
encouraged to find another job. It seemed that the parent company no longer wanted to keep the 
subsidiary. 
 
 
 
  
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
6.1. Theoretical Contributions 
 
The article shows that logics and practices are transformed through the transformation of objects. 
The detailed description of how a working group (re)designed an equity investment process in 
response to new demands for SRI gives strong support for this assumption. By exploring the process 
of transformation of logics itself, the article offers new perspectives on the mechanisms of the 
transformation of logics in practice. Namely, it demonstrates that objects – in this case, market devices 
– play a key role in the transformation of logics by providing actors with a medium through which 
transforming their logics and practices. This is possible thanks to the double status of objects as 
‘technical’ and ‘epistemic,’ which both enable and constrain the transformation of logics (i.e. maintain 
previous logics while enabling their transformation).   
 
By exploring the process of institutional change itself, the article has offered new perspectives on 
the mechanisms of institutional change in practice. Namely, it has demonstrated that institutional 
change disrupts collective activity through disrupting the relationship between a technical object and 
its associated ‘usual’ practices; which transforms the latter into an epistemic object. Thanks to a 
collective inquiry, actors aim to transform the epistemic object back to a technical object in order to 
restore day-to-day practices. Throughout, they transform their collective activity, practices, technical 
objects and institutional logics in response to institutional change. Thus, the article has argued that 
while institutional change has triggered the inquiry, it has not directly transformed institutional logics. 
Instead, the transformation of institutional logics has been an output of the inquiry. 
 
In demonstrating this, the article expands previous research on logics by directly examining the 
transformation of logics within an organization. Regarding the lack of intellectual relationships 
between institutional theories, on the one hand, and practice theories, on the other, this topic is a key 
one for understanding institutional change in practice. In particular, over the past few years, this 
bridging between practice and institutional theories has been frequently required from both 
institutional scholars (Lounsbury & Crumley, 2007; Powell & Colyvas, 2008) and practice scholars 
(Weick, 1995). Furthermore, the article enriches previous research by focusing on the role of objects 
in the transformation of logics, a topic which has been little researched until now (Friedland, 2009; 
Kaghan & Lounsbury, 2005; Miller, 2008; Spee & Jarzbkowski, 2009). This furthers our 
understanding of how actors embody and transform their logics and practices through epistemic 
objects. Nevertheless, other studies of institutional change in practice are needed to generalize these 
findings more broadly. 
 
Regarding SRI, this article is among the few studies that have analyzed the workings of an asset 
management company in practice and the impacts of new demands for SRI on asset management 
practices. Notably, this is explained by the fact that the phenomenon of SRI is very recent and still 
ongoing. Given that SRI Mainstreaming is from now on a major topic for asset management 
worldwide (Robecco & Booz, 2008), this article may help us to understand and predict the expected 
impacts of SRI demands on the financial sector. 
 
6.2. Methodological Contributions 
 
By using a non-representational epistemology, based on the pragmatist concept of inquiry (Dewey, 
1938; Peirce, 1931), the article has aimed to enrich methodologies following representational 
epistemologies (Lorino et al., 2010). Notably, this methodology has enabled accessing the complexity 
of practices by exploring not only what was directly observable but also the processes of their 
transformation. In doing so, the article has demonstrated that pragmatist methods, such as the 
cooperative inquiry method (Heron, 1996; Heron & Reason, 1995), enable researchers to access the 
everyday practices of actors. When a researcher investigates a situation, instead of observing it, he/she 
is more likely to understand the ‘accounting practices’ of actors (Garfinkel, 1967). In particular, this 
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epistemological position is all the more important when researchers aim to understand the process of 
change itself. In addition, the article has offered methodological insights on pragmatist research. 
Regarding the growing interest for pragmatism over the past few years (Lukka & Modell, 2009; 
Simpson, 2009), this use of a cooperative inquiry method could be valuable for further research. 
 
6.3. Limitations and Perspectives 
 
Three limitations of the study call for further research. Firstly, it was difficult to determine from the 
case study whether the change in institutional logics at the company level concerned the sector as a 
whole. On the one hand, lack of time prevented me from assessing the long-term impacts of 
institutional change on practices, and on the other, the study of other asset management companies 
would have been necessary to be able to argue that institutional logics were transformed at the sector 
level. Secondly, the article did not explore whether the transformation of practices impacted 
institutional change. This effect could have occurred in three main ways: 1) the transformation of 
client demands (i.e. change in the offer); 2) the transformation of asset managers’ practices (i.e. 
change in the sector) and 3) the transformation of standards (i.e. change in SRI norms, for instance 
SRI labels). Moreover, interactions between SRI Invest and the rest of the sector were not explicitly 
examined, which may convey the idea of an armchair (re)design. Yet, the working group members 
constantly interacted with their environment throughout the process. Further work is needed to account 
for these relationships. Lastly, given the financial crisis and other organizational elements, such as the 
lack of assets, the study was not able to fully assess the impacts of the inquiry on practices. In other 
words, it was difficult to determine whether the inquiry was successful.  
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Turn Over xxx xxxx xxx xxx Domains
11740 43,71 11,12 8,03 0,43 Environnement xxx Excellent [..]
Social xxx Very good [...]
Debt xxx Governance xxx Sector average [...]
23,78 Societal xxx Weaken aspect [...]
xxx PER xxx xxx xxx
1,427E+10 6,565 7,363 0,57
Price to 
book Stock xxx xxx xxx Homogeneity xxx Good
0,82 11,68 22,24 10,25 -46,837 Dynamism xxx Good
Strategy xxx Good
Consensus xxx xxx xxx xxx
2,684 19 3 11 5
A very good [...]
A good integration in [...]
None
None
X is the bank the more exposed to the crisis...[...]
Increase Valuation
Consensus
Good level of 
transparence [...]
Asset Manager Position
Discussion on the 
elements [...]
Decision Matrix
Risk management is 
particurlaly [...]
A macro analysis would 
have been [...]
A clear lack of 
stakeholders [...]
Qualitative Analyst
CSR Management Systems
>High-level quality of the environmental & social reporting
Lack of women [...]
Societal aspects suffer 
from [...]
Banks
X presents a good profile in terms of [...] but suffers from [...]. 
Date
2008/26/02
Rating
SRI AnalystCountry
Financial Rating
Structure Ratios
Innovation (+)
Co2 emissions are 
particurlarly [...]
Integration of disabled 
[...]
Exploitation Ratios
SRI Rating
Quantitative Analysis
The management of 
stress constitutes [...]
John SmithFRANCE
SRI Analyst Position
Shortcoming (-)
Value
X
Sector
